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Russia: Turn to China? 
Margarete Klein and Kirsten Westphal 
After its relations with the West deteriorated massively in the course of the Ukraine 
crisis, Russia has been aligning itself increasingly towards China. This shift is most ob-
vious in the strategic spheres of military and energy cooperation. Even if the immediate 
impacts on Germany and the European Union – caused by the dynamics in the relation-
ship between these two major neighbours in the East – are limited, the development 
is of great relevance for international relations and the global order. It would therefore 
be wrong to underestimate the long-term ramifications. Germany and the European 
Union should counterbalance these nascent tectonic shifts with inclusive and multi-
lateral cooperation and dialogue initiatives in the Euro-Asian region. Regional and global 
cooperation should be shaped by economic exchange, infrastructure expansion and the 
search for solutions to global problems. 
 
Moscow has been successively expanding its 
relations with Beijing since the end of the 
Cold War – from the “constructive partner-
ship” (1994) and the “strategic partnership 
of cooperation” (1996) through to the “com-
prehensive, deepening strategic partner-
ship” (2010). Whereas overcoming bilateral 
tensions was uppermost from the 1960s 
to the 1980s, since the mid-1990s the pair 
have been cooperating wherever shared 
interests exist. These extend from rejection 
of what is felt to be a US-dominated world 
order and associated “colour revolutions” 
through the wish for political stability in 
the shared Central Asian neighbourhood 
to the expansion of bilateral economic 
relations. The growing importance of Asia 
is also reflected in Russia’s foreign trade. 
Since 2008 Russia has been importing more 
goods from China than from Germany, 
while the two alternate as first and second 
destination for its exports. Military and 
energy cooperation are especially strategic. 
China’s rise, the American “pivot to Asia” 
and Moscow’s desire to play a greater role 
again in East Asia have further boosted the 
Russian “povorot na vostok” (turn to the 
East) and its China policy since the end 
of the 2000s. But it is only since relations 
with the West collapsed in the course of 
the Ukraine crisis that Russian political dis-
course has begun presenting convergence 
with Beijing not just as a supplement to its 
relations with the West, but as a long-term 
reorientation and rejection of the West. 
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Security and Military Policy 
In the area of security Moscow has been 
pursuing a dual strategy towards Beijing. 
Its first pillar is formed by engagement such 
as military/political dialogue, joint exer-
cises and armaments cooperation designed 
to improve mutual trust and transparency 
and facilitate a joint threat response. Both 
countries feel threatened by spillover effects 
from the Central Asian neighbourhood, 
including Islamist extremism, terrorism 
and drug trafficking, but also by the United 
States’s superior military capabilities. Do-
mestically Beijing and Moscow share con-
cerns about “colour revolutions”, which 
they both regard as Western-inspired 
insurrection seeking regime change. Above 
all, the Kremlin uses joint military exer-
cises as a show of strength towards NATO 
and the United States. 
Moscow also worries about China’s rise 
and long-term intentions, even if this has 
never appeared in any official document 
out of political consideration for the “stra-
tegic partner”. Since the end of the Cold 
War the power relationship between China 
and Russia has reversed, to the latter’s 
detriment. For example, today China’s GDP 
is more than four times Russia’s. In the 
military sphere, while Russia can continue 
to rely on its lead in nuclear weaponry, 
China’s conventional forces are already in 
many respects quantitatively and qualita-
tively superior. In 2014 the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army possessed more than three 
times as many soldiers than the Russian 
armed forces, as well as a clear numerical 
advantage in tanks and warplanes. Beijing’s 
$129 billion defence budget for 2014 was 
almost double Russia’s ($70 billion). 
The Kremlin is aware that China’s mili-
tary expansion is directed primarily against 
the United States rather than Russia, and 
intended to back up its claim to leadership 
in East Asia. But the growing military 
imbalance contains the danger of Beijing 
acting more assertively towards Moscow 
in future conflicts, for example over access 
to resources in Russia’s Far East. For this 
reason, the second pillar of Moscow’s dual 
strategy is to foster indirect balancing 
against China. This includes preserving 
its defensive capability towards China by 
modernising its nuclear arsenal and ex-
panding its strategic air defences in the 
East. Russia is also working to contain China 
in two respects: On the one hand, it sup-
plies modern weapons systems to countries 
that are China’s rivals or involved in terri-
torial conflicts, such as India and Vietnam. 
On the other, it avoids supplying China with 
the very latest Russian weapons systems. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis over 
Ukraine, Moscow has concentrated one-
sidedly on expanding the cooperation pillar 
of its dual strategy, as reflected above all 
in an increase in the frequency, scope and 
intensity of joint manoeuvres. After a long 
period where Sino-Russian military exer-
cises were restricted to the border region 
and the shared Central Asian neighbour-
hood, in 2015 the two navies exercised 
jointly for the first time in the Mediter-
ranean (May) and the Sea of Japan (August). 
The spectrum of operations has also been 
broadened from fighting terrorism, insur-
gency and piracy to repelling enemy attack 
and even offensive operations. In August 
2015, for example, Russian and Chinese 
marines together practised an amphibious 
landing for the first time. The degree of 
interoperability is also increasing. Whereas 
previous Sino-Russian exercises tended to 
proceed as parallel manoeuvres by the two 
forces, since 2014 some Russian and Chi-
nese soldiers have been training in mixed 
groups under joint command. Moscow and 
Beijing are naturally still a long way from 
being able to conduct a major integrated 
operation. But they are expanding their 
ability to conduct joint military operations 
in local and regional conflicts, especially 
in the Central Asian neighbourhood. 
The two sides have expanded coopera-
tion in other spheres of security, too. The 
framework agreement on cooperation on 
questions of international information 
security, signed by Moscow and Beijing on 
30 April 2015, is especially significant. In it 
the two sides promise to refrain from cyber-
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attacks on one another and to take joint 
action against “technologies” that endan-
ger the “security and stability” of the state 
or seek to “destabilise the socio-economic 
situation” internally. As such both sides 
are enhancing their coordination, both in 
cyber-defence against third states and with 
respect to state control of the internet and 
thus the prevention of “colour revolutions”. 
While substantially expanding its secu-
rity cooperation with Beijing, Moscow is 
finding it increasingly difficult to maintain 
the countervailing force pillar of its dual 
strategy at the existing level. Although the 
Kremlin can continue to rely on its nuclear 
deterrent and is continuing defence coopera-
tion with Vietnam and India, it has had 
to abandon its previous caution over arms 
exports to China. Although Russia has 
been China’s largest arms supplier since 
the 1990s, it has in the past refrained from 
exporting the latest developments to China 
out of security concerns, and to some ex-
tent fear of product piracy. But in April 
2015, according to press reports, Moscow 
signed a deal to supply S-400 anti-aircraft 
systems, even if many details – including 
the delivery date and precise type of missile 
– remain unclear. Talks are still ongoing 
over the sale of the latest warplane, the 
Su-35. 
Exporting such weapons systems is not 
only militarily sensitive, but also politically. 
If the S-400 version with a range of four 
hundred kilometres is supplied, this would 
enable China not only to penetrate Tai-
wanese airspace, but also to operate over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are 
contested between Japan and China. In 
strengthening China’s ability to project 
power, Moscow is undermining its own 
hitherto neutral position in territorial 
conflicts in the South and East China Seas. 
Another sign of Moscow quietly abandon-
ing its neutrality and supporting Chinese 
hegemonic strivings was the Russian navy’s 
first joint manoeuvre with China in the Sea 
of Japan in August 2015. Previously con-
sideration for Japan would have precluded 
such a move. These latest arms sales and 
manoeuvres narrow Moscow’s options in 
East Asia. 
Energy 
Europe has traditionally been the most 
important market for Russian oil and gas. 
Almost two-thirds of Russia’s oil and nearly 
half of Gazprom’s gas production are ex-
ported to the European Union. The comple-
mentarity between a resource-poor con-
sumer region and an energy-rich producer, 
as well as their geographical proximity, 
have promoted expansion of infrastructure 
and trade over many decades. In the com-
ing decade too, Europe will remain Russia’s 
largest export market. 
When relations with the European 
Union deteriorated in the wake of the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 
and the implementation of the EU’s third 
internal energy market package in 2009, 
Moscow repeatedly threatened to redirect 
gas exports eastwards. Since 2014 geopoliti-
cal considerations have accelerated energy 
cooperation with China. 
In fact, geoeconomic shifts alone would 
be reason enough for Russia to diversify 
towards Asia, as the international energy 
markets are presently characterised by deep 
and rapid change. Demand for oil and gas is 
growing above all in the Asia-Pacific region, 
whereas consumption in Europe is stag-
nating or falling. As a traditional pipeline 
exporter, Russia has largely missed out on 
an increase of more than one quarter in 
trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the 
past decade. Only since 2010 has Russia – 
the world’s largest gas exporter – been ex-
porting LNG from its Sakhalin II Terminal, 
and even then this amounts to just 4 per-
cent of the total global LNG supply. Frack-
ing in the United States has also consider-
ably increased the global oil and gas supply. 
Russia finds itself exposed to growing com-
petition not only in the global markets, but 
also in its traditional pipeline market in 
Europe.  
Russia therefore needs to diversify its 
exports and flexibilise its transport options 
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and contract structures if it is to defend its 
export markets. In 2010 Russia’s “Energy 
Strategy 2030” set a goal of expanding sales 
to Asia, further concretised at the begin-
ning of 2014: by 2025 oil and gas exports 
to Asia are to be doubled. Late, but energeti-
cally, Moscow is working to advance the 
“povorot na vostok” in the sphere of energy, 
for example via repeated alterations to the 
tax system since 2013. This is of great im-
portance to the Kremlin not only in terms 
of foreign trade, but also for the economy 
as a whole, because its “Gas Programme for 
the East” adopted in 2007 proposes develop-
ing the gas sector in Eastern Siberia and the 
Far East. Thus from an economic perspec-
tive it makes sense to expand the gas fields 
and infrastructure both for domestic de-
mand and for export. 
The turn to Asia in fact follows a similar 
logic to the close energy partnership be-
tween Russia and Western Europe in the 
second half of the twentieth century: 
energy-rich Russia cooperates with energy-
hungry China. However, manifestations 
of crisis in the Russian economy, low oil 
prices and sanctions are producing un-
wanted effects and hampering both infra-
structure expansion and the development 
of new fields. Western sanctions target the 
neuralgic technologies required to rapidly 
expand market share in Asia: the exploita-
tion of shale oil and tight oil formations 
and deep-sea projects in the Arctic and off 
Sakhalin Island. Financing through the in-
ternational capital markets is also restricted. 
With access to Western financial markets 
subject to sanctions, Russia all the more 
urgently needs hard currency revenues. 
The situation of Russian energy giants like 
Rosneft and Gazprom also depends on 
their hard currency revenues and the ratio 
of rouble to hard currency expenditure. 
Although the crisis over Ukraine has 
acted as a catalyst to intensify and accel-
erate Sino-Russian cooperation, Russia’s 
means for implementing the turn to China 
while guarding its strategic interests are 
shrinking. The Power of Siberia gas pipeline 
agreed in May 2014 was supposed to come 
on stream at the end of 2017, supplying 
China with 38 billion cubic metres of natu-
ral gas annually for thirty years. Even at the 
time the deal was signed, it was regarded 
as unlikely that the project would turn a 
profit for Gazprom until the 2020s. But now 
high development and construction costs 
and the unfavourable turn in gas prices are 
burdening the operator even more strongly 
than expected and the project is suffering 
delays. This is in fact not unwelcome for 
China, which is experiencing structural 
adaptation processes in the economy as a 
whole that will slow growth in demand 
and reform its gas market and gas pricing 
mechanisms. Under these circumstances 
the “West route”, the so-called Altai Pipe-
line with a projected initial annual capacity 
of 30 billion cubic metres, can be regarded 
as a remote prospect at best. This situation 
presents Gazprom with a dilemma: Its gas 
fields in the East are still in the develop-
ment phase and lack treatment facilities to 
supply gas in the required dry quality via 
the Power of Siberia pipeline. At the same 
time the company finds itself confronted 
with a potential gas surplus in Western 
Siberia, where it has developed fields for 
the European market whose gas is now no 
longer required. From that perspective, the 
West route would make more sense for Gaz-
prom, as it would permit a flexibilisation of 
exports. But it would end in the province of 
Xinjiang, far from the centres of consump-
tion – just where the pipeline from Central 
Asia ends too. Russian and Chinese interests 
are thus only partially compatible and char-
acterised by asymmetry. 
In the Russian oil sector, on the other 
hand, growing Chinese long-term invest-
ment is already flowing and the Siberian 
fields have been connected to the Chinese 
market. In 2002 oligarch Mikhail Khodor-
kovsky’s energy company YUKOS (since 
broken up) raised hackles in the Moscow 
establishment with its plan to build a pipe-
line to China. But by 2008 Russian state-
owned companies Rosneft and Transneft 
had reached agreement with China on joint 
funding of the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean 
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(ESPO) pipeline in return for 15 million 
tonnes of crude annually for twenty years. 
The first deliveries to Daqing in China 
occurred in 2011. ESPO is now the world’s 
longest oil pipeline, with a capacity of one 
million barrels per day. It branches near 
the Russian town of Skovorodino, with one 
spur going to China, a second to the Rus-
sian export port of Kozmino. Between 2010 
and 2014 Russian crude oil exports to China 
more than doubled to almost 30 million 
tonnes. China now accounts for a good 
13 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports.  
The sanctions against Russia open up 
new possibilities for China, because approval 
processes have made importing technology 
from the West slower and more compli-
cated, and above all refinancing of projects 
has become more laborious. The difficult 
situation has led Russia to open up resources 
that had previously been earmarked as stra-
tegic and relevant for the national interest 
to Chinese investors and to rely on import-
ing crucial technologies from China. Thus 
Rosneft is negotiating with the state-owned 
China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) to sell a 10 percent stake in the Van-
kor oilfield – the main source of oil trans-
ported through the ESPO pipeline. Rosneft 
is already cooperating with the Chinese oil 
and gas company Sinopec to develop tight 
oil fields in Eastern Siberia, and CNPC is a 
partner in the project to liquefy natural 
gas on Russia’s Yamal Peninsula. And Russia 
and China are intensifying their coopera-
tion in other parts of the energy sector too, 
the strategically most important being civil 
nuclear technology. The two countries are 
competitors here, but can also profit from 
cooperation. 
Symbolic Politics with Substance 
Russia’s turn to China represents more than 
mere symbolism. In recent years it has sig-
nificantly gained in substance in almost all 
areas. 
China has become the country outside 
the post-Soviet space with which Russia 
maintains its closest military relations. 
Intensified exercise activities will make 
it easier for them to take joint action in 
future, especially in Central Asia. In cyber-
security, too, Beijing and Moscow are sig-
nificantly expanding their coordination. 
Yet Western worries about a formal Rus-
sian-Chinese military alliance are exagger-
ated. Neither side is seriously interested in 
such a move, which would restrict their 
own freedom of action. 
Cooperation in the field of energy is also 
currently being expanded. This allows both 
sides to diversify their trade relations and 
Russia to gain market share in China. 
Nonetheless Russia’s turn to China should 
not be overrated. Cooperation has its limits, 
and despite cooperation arenas of conflict 
that could burden the relationship in future 
still remain. Moreover, since the end of the 
Cold War the bilateral balance of power has 
altered to Moscow’s detriment in almost all 
aspects. Russian hopes of playing China 
and the West against each other as a sought-
after “swing state” had already proven over-
optimistic before the crisis over Ukraine. 
Now Russia is even losing the ability to 
assert its interests on equal terms. So the 
costs of the turn to China are considerable 
for Russia. Short-term interests in political 
symbolism and tangible economic neces-
sities override long-term strategic consider-
ations. As a consequence Moscow’s leeway 
shrinks. 
Moscow has pursued a strategy of ex-
panding political and economic relations 
with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
But the “povorot na vostok” – actually con-
ceived as a turn to East Asia as a whole – 
now threatens to shrink to a turn to China. 
Although Russia is still making overtures to 
Japan on security and energy, Japanese sanc-
tions and intensified Sino-Russian military 
cooperation have noticeably darkened the 
relationship with Tokyo. Moreover, growing 
financial constraints are narrowing Russia’s 
possibilities to expand infrastructure for 
exports to other Asian markets. 
Russia’s strategy of flexibilising its ex-
ports with the help of natural gas lique-
faction and new pipelines encounters its 
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limits in the partnership with China. Being 
so closely tied to a single purchaser now 
impinges on its role as a global exporter. 
For example, expanding Russian ESPO ex-
ports to Daqing undermines the goal of 
establishing ESPO blend crude as a new 
price reference by withdrawing volume 
from the spot market in Kozmino. China 
has not only secured specific volumes for 
twenty years, but also a particular quality 
of crude.  
As Russia gradually exhausts the finan-
cial resources it needs to respond adequately 
to the geoeconomic shifts, the Kremlin in-
creasingly turns to symbolic politics and 
demonstrations that the country is not 
isolated internationally. The focus here is 
on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and 
cooperation with China. Cooperation with 
other emerging economies, like the BRICS 
summit hosted in the Russian city of Ufa in 
June 2015, and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), also gains in impor-
tance in this context. But in these formats 
it is China that is increasingly setting the 
agenda, as reflected in Russia’s agreement 
at the SCO in Ufa to seek integration of the 
EEU with the Chinese Silk Road Initiative 
(“one belt, one road”, OBOR). Both these 
projects were concretised during the Bei-
jing International Economic Forum in Sep-
tember 2015 in a cooperation agreement 
and various other arrangements in the con-
text of the Silk Road economic alliance. 
Repercussions for Germany and 
the European Union 
Russia is seeking to play the China card 
in its conflicts with the European Union, 
NATO and the United States. But the threat 
scenario this generates is not terribly cred-
ible, because Moscow and Beijing ultimately 
remain a long way from forming any kind 
of formal anti-Western alliance. Nonethe-
less, long-term consequences are becoming 
visible for global and regional order(s) and 
governance in important policy fields.  
Moscow and Beijing share important 
criticisms of Western-dominated governance 
structures and principles, and are joining 
forces to either modify these to their satis-
faction or to weaken them through alter-
native forums like BRICS. This could reduce 
the West’s ability to set the global agenda 
and determine the framing of international 
politics.  
This also touches on the attractiveness 
and legitimacy of political systems. Russia 
and China are keen to establish a narrow 
interpretation of the humanitarian respon-
sibility to protect and to popularise their 
interpretation of the “colour revolutions” 
as new form of Western warfare. Above and 
beyond the normative level, both countries 
are expanding their ability to defend against 
“colour revolutions”, as demonstrated 
by their cyber-cooperation. A situation of 
closer relations between Russia and China 
also possesses the potential to bolster 
authoritarian systems and undermine the 
Western model of liberal democracy and 
rule of law. 
This alliance also possesses the potential 
to change the existing liberal economic 
order, which is heavily based on free trade, 
investment and access to resources – al-
though not to completely supplant it. After 
all, Russia and China also profit from func-
tioning markets. But situations of scarcity 
could lead both to cease relying entirely on 
market forces, instrumentalising instead 
the close ties between state-owned com-
panies along the value chain. Both are also 
united by their wish to break the dominance 
of Western currencies and structures in in-
ternational financial transactions (such as 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunication, SWIFT). Both are 
dissatisfied with the international archi-
tecture of Bretton Woods and the institu-
tions dominated by the OECD. That is 
behind their participation in founding new 
institutions such as the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank and the New Develop-
ment Bank (BRICS). 
At the same time Russia and China are 
working on a restructuring of economic 
spaces. This can be observed in their talks 
about reducing barriers to trade, and above 
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all in infrastructure expansion. Joining 
OBOR with the Eurasian Economic Union 
and expanding the Shanghai Organisation 
by admitting observers such as Mongolia 
and Iran creates new realities for Western 
influence and presents the EU’s Central 
Asia Strategy, for example, with new chal-
lenges. It also hampers Europe’s efforts to 
diversify its energy sources. 
Closer relations between Russia and 
China also have repercussions for bilateral 
energy relations between Russia and the 
European Union. Although in the short and 
medium term the EU remains the most im-
portant market for Russia – which urgently 
needs the revenues to fund projects orien-
tated towards Asia – in the longer term its 
importance for Russian energy exports is 
likely to shrink (in relative terms). Firstly, 
consequences for quality and quantity are 
to be expected, as Russia diverts increasing 
amounts of eastern Siberian high-quality 
light crude from towards Asia to meet its 
pledges on volume and quality. Secondly, 
structural shifts may occur. If European 
companies lose out to Chinese rivals over 
access to the Russian market, this will nar-
row their market access and capitalisation. 
In the longer term this could seriously dis-
rupt the functioning of the free market, 
above all if supply is further constricted. 
It is also Western firms that possess the 
production-boosting technologies required 
to maintain Russia’s oil production at a 
high level. 
There is also a risk of the international 
governance of energy relations becoming 
drawn in sooner or later in. To date it has 
been shaped by the organisations and 
mechanisms initiated by the OECD states 
after 1973 and the G8 states after 2007. 
These include the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) with its collective crisis mecha-
nisms, and transparency initiatives like 
the Joint Organisation Data Initiative (JODI) 
at the International Energy Forum (IEF). 
Geopolitical distractions have also held 
up the IEA’s association process, which 
had been advancing steadily since 2007 
and also included Russia and China. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Closer relations between Russia and China 
represent a challenge for Germany and 
Europe. Their cooperation has grown more 
substantial and could in the longer perspec-
tive restrict European options and funda-
mentally alter the global framework. Ger-
many and Europe should devote greater 
attention to this development and include 
it in their strategic considerations.  
It is not in the German or European in-
terest for Russia to become a junior partner 
one-sidedly strengthening China’s position, 
nor for the global and regional convergence 
between Beijing and Moscow to proceed at 
the expense of Europe’s policy options. It 
would therefore be advisable to resume 
pragmatic cooperation with Russia in fields 
of shared interest. In a “compartmental-
ised” form this would mean restricting the 
negative spillover effects of the crisis over 
Ukraine on other regions and the global 
level. But any watering down of the Minsk 
II agreement should be avoided. Shared 
interests exist, for example, in stabilising 
Afghanistan and the Middle East, in non-
proliferation policy and in fighting terror-
ism and Islamist extremism. As far as East 
Asia is concerned, it would be in the inter-
ests of both Russia and the European Union 
to find peaceful resolutions to the North 
Korean nuclear issue and the territorial dis-
putes in the East and South China Seas. The 
European Union should therefore step up its 
political dialogue with Russia on East Asia.  
States in the Euro-Asian region that find 
themselves being sucked into the Sino-Rus-
sian spheres of influence should be offered 
alternative courses of action. The Organisa-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) should place a connectivity initia-
tive of its own alongside China’s Silk Road 
Initiative. 
Energy and economic relations in the 
Euro-Asian region should not be further 
securitised. The guiding principles should 
instead be trade, interdependency and 
infrastructure expansion. 
To date the European Commission has 
prioritised bilateral dialogues and the Euro-
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pean Energy Community in the immediate 
neighbourhood. This approach is geograph-
ically and substantively short-sighted. It 
needs to be backed up with inclusive re-
gional governance initiatives (such as the 
OSCE, the Energy Charter process and 
the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
UNECE), to develop agreed sets of rules. 
At the global level, finally, the inclusion 
of influential states in the IEA needs to be 
pushed more energetically, because the 
establishment of parallel institutions runs 
counter to Western interests. 
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